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GIDEON'S PARADOX
Lawrence C. Marshall*
America's most dominant images of justice and law focus on
equality. The United States Supreme Court beckons all to come forth
and partake of "equal justice under law." 1 Lady justice is made to
wear a blindfold, so she is not influenced by whether prince or pauper
stands before her.2 Although other professions, such as education and
medicine, also value the principle, no other field is as dominated by
the image of equality.
The reason for this focus on equality lies in the essence of what
justice and the rule of law mean. Before there was the rule of law,
there was the rule of power. The strongest man ruled the tribe. The
man with the biggest club was always right. Justice mattered not. The
aspiration of any modern legal system is to move away from this rule
of power and to resolve disputes in accordance with principles of
justice and morality. This goal can only be achieved by a system that
is committed fundamentally to equality before the bench. If legal
disputes are still being resolved in accordance with who is more
powerful-who can buy the better lawyer, who can yield the most
influence-then we have not really moved beyond the rule of power
after all. Law without equality is lawlessness.
It follows, then, that when we talk about equality within the
framework of justice we are not simply talking about how to distribute
the commodity of justice and distribute it more broadly. Unlike
medicine, where there can be great advances, even if we fail to make
those breakthroughs widely available, there can be no justice when
the wealthy enjoy advantages in the courts that are wildly disparate
from the tools available to the poor. Without some degree of
equality, there simply is no justice. There is only the rule of powerthe antithesis of the rule of law.
With the publication of Access to Justice, Deborah Rhode has
documented the extent to which the goal of equality-and hence the

* Visiting Professor and Interim Director of Clinical Education, Stanford Law School;
Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Legal Director,
Northwestern University Center on Wrongful Convictions. Many thanks to Gabriel
Soledad (Stanford Law School '05) for his help in the preparation of this Essay.
1. Robert Shnayerson, The Illustrated History of the Supreme Court of the
United States 6 (1986).
2. See generally Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (1990).
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promise of justice-remains unfulfilled in the United States.' Beyond
cursing that darkness, Rhode lights a candelabra by focusing on ways
in which we can enhance access to justice in a broad array of settings.
Rhode's book has the potential to open America's eyes to the
desperate need for reform.
I. THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

The need for rousing the public and policy makers is particularly
acute in the arena of indigent criminal defense. In theory, the promise
of meaningful indigent defense is already in place. Forty years ago the
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright
recognized that the right to counsel is the great equalizer in the
courtroom.4 There can be no fair trial, the court declared, when a
criminal defendant is denied counsel.5 As Justice Black explained,
"[t]hat government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of
the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities,
not luxuries." 6 Yet, two score after that broad declaration, the
evidence is clear-as Rhode demonstrates-that many indigent
defendants are still forced to defend themselves without access to any
meaningful assistance of counsel.7
This problem is far from universal. In some jurisdictions, bar
leaders, legislators, and judges have made extraordinary commitments
to creating high-quality indigent defense systems. There are some
public defender offices in this country providing defense services that
rival the best available in the private market.' The same is true for
many lawyers who take on court appointments. In both settings there
are many experienced and dedicated lawyers who are committed
public servants. So long as they continue to receive appropriate levels
of funding, and are provided sufficient independence, they will
continue to ethically represent their clients in precisely the manner
that Gideon envisioned.
In far too many jurisdictions, however, the quality of lawyering that
a poor defendant gets is disgraceful, as Rhode documents.9 These
instances are far more widespread than any of us want to believe.
Yet, they generally are not apt to attract attention. A man who is

3. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice (2004).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. Id. at 343-44.
6. Id. at 344.
7. See Rhode, supra note 3. at 123-30.
8. See izenerallv Charles J. Ogletree. Jr.. An Essay on the New Public Defender
for the 21st Century. 58 Law & Contemn. Probs. 81 (1995): Inea L. Parsons. "Makink
it a FederalCase": A Model for Indigent Representation, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 837,
839 n.7 (1999).
9. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 123-30.
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released after spending months in jail without access to a lawyer will
be taking no appeal; he is pleased that charges against him are
eventually dropped-even if his time spent in detention exceeds the
sentence that would have been imposed had he been convicted. The
defendant who waives counsel and pleads guilty after her hurried
conversation with the prosecutor will also be unlikely to appeal-she
believes that her plea was a bargain (they call them "plea bargains,"
don't they?), and knows that she was not giving up much by waiving
her right to counsel, given the kind of counsel she would have been
afforded had she demanded one. Even in its most basic form-the
naked right to counsel-there are locations in which Gideon is not
being satisfied and very few in power are noticing.
The far more pervasive problem that affects the implementation of
Gideon, however, relates not to whether some "lawyer" will be
available, but to whether that lawyer will have the competency,
independence, and resources to provide a meaningful defense. The
right to counsel is not simply the right to some living, breathing being
who happens to have secured and retained a law license. Rather, the
right to appointed counsel is an entitlement to a reasonably
competent, reasonably independent counsel with reasonably adequate
resources. As the Court explained in Strickland v. Washington:
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial
alongside the accused... is not enough to satisfy the constitutional
command. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the
assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role
that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether
who plays the role necessary to ensure that
retained or appointed,
0
the trial is fair.'
This is not to say that indigent defendants are entitled to the same
defense that the multi-millionaire could secure. There are baseline
levels of competence, independence, and resources that are critical,
however. When we fall below these baselines, the right to counsel is
not being respected.
As Rhode explains, our legal system often reneges on its promise to
provide such counsel. 1 We have counties in which the contract to
represent the county's indigent defendants is offered to the lowest
bidder, without regard to experience, qualification, or the ability to
spend a reasonable amount of time on given cases. 2 Obviously, the
lowest bidder may well be the attorney who is most willing to shirk
responsibilities to the clients by spending insufficient time
10. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
11. See Rhode, supra note 3. at 123-30.
12. See id. at 126: see also Robert L. Snangenberp & Marea L. Beeman. Indigent
Defense Svstems in the United States. 58 Law & ContemD. Probs. 31 (1995): Low-Bid
CriminalDefense Contracting: Justice in Retreat, Champion, Nov. 1997, at 22.
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investigating cases, meeting with clients, and undertaking the other
tasks essential to mounting a competent defense.
In other situations, local judges appoint counsel in individual
cases. 3 In far too many cases, these appointments are a form of
patronage, having everything to do with connections, and nothing to
do with qualifications. Indeed, there are many instances in which it
appears obvious that judges are choosing lawyers whom the judges
trust will14 not put up much of a fight and will keep the assembly line
moving.
Even in states or counties with public defender systems which are
generally considered the best way to provide indigent defense
services, 5 there are many instances in which those offices are so
underfunded and understaffed that it is simply impossible for the
lawyers-no matter how well intentioned-to provide adequate
representation to all of the indigent defendants whom they are
appointed to defend. 6 Through no fault of the lawyers, a system that
forces them to represent so many clients in so little time generates
assembly-line justice of the crudest form. Surely Gideon never
envisioned lawyers and clients meeting just minutes before guilty
pleas are entered or cases proceed to trial. The right to counsel
cannot be satisfied where the entirety of the lawyer-client relationship
is a hushed and hurried conversation in the bullpen behind the
courtroom, in the hallway, or in the courtroom itself.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Powell v. Alabama, the
"Scottsboro Boys" case, "perhaps the most critical period of the
proceedings" is the period during which counsel has the opportunity
for pre-trial consultation, preparation, and investigation. 7 Yet, like
the Scottsboro defendants, so many defendants today do not "have
the aid of counsel in any real sense," during the pre-trial phase,
"although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as
18
at the trial itself.'
Indeed, the problem of inadequate counsel and inadequate
resources exists even in the one area in which most would tend to
assume that the right to competent counsel is being the most
respected: capital cases. Before dismissing the stories of the sleeping
13. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 127-28; see also Spangenberg & Beeman, supra
note 12.
14. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor. The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1855-57 (1994).
15. See S. Ctr. for Human Rights, "If You Cannot Afford a Lawyer...": A
Report on Georgia's Failed Indigent Defense System 16 (Jan. 2003) (noting that "[i]f
funded adequately, a public defender is the most efficient and cost-effective system to
provide
competent
counsel
to
poor
defendants"),
available
at
http://www.schr.org/reports/docs/an.%202003.%20report.pdf.
16. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 128-29.
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
18. Id.

2004]

GIDEON'S PARADOX

and drunk lawyers in capital cases as freak occurrences, 9 consider that
in Illinois, thirty-three defendants who were sentenced to death were

represented at trial by an attorney who had once been, or was later,
disbarred or suspended. 0 One of these lawyers had been the subject

Another had been
of seventy-eight disciplinary complaints.2 '
disbarred but was later reinstated despite serious issues regarding his
emotional stability and drinking. He soon proceeded to represent
four men who landed on death row. Shortly thereafter he was
disbarred again.22 Among the other attorneys who have been
appointed in Illinois to represent indigent defendants in capital cases

are "a tax lawyer who had never before tried a case, an attorney just
two years out of law school" who was juggling his capital case with
one hundred other criminal cases, and "another attorney just ten days
off a suspension for incompetence and dishonesty" exhibited in six
separate cases.23 One defendant, Jeffrey Rissley, was represented by

an appointed lawyer who specialized in probate and real estate.
When this lawyer was later asked if he had ever handled a criminal

jury trial by himself, he responded, "Well, is paternity criminal?"24 It

is no wonder that Illinois Governor George Ryan declared that he had
no confidence in the results of a system that allowed lawyers like these
to handle capital cases.25
II. THE ROADS NOT YET TAKEN
The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants has issued a blueprint for confronting this
crisis. The Committee's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery
19. See Rhode, supra note 3, at 136-37 (discussing Burdine v. Johnson, 362 F.3d
386 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc) and other cases); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter,
Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic's Call to Presume
Prejudice from RetpresentationalAbsence. 76 Tem). L. Rev. 827 (2003).
20. Ken Armstron2 & Steve Mills. Death Row Justice Derailed: Bias. Errors and
Incompetence in Capital Cases Have Turned Illinois' Harshest Punishment into Its
Least Credible. Chi. Trib.. Nov. 14. 1999. at 1.
21. Ken Armstron2 & Steve Mills. Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts: With their Lives
at Stake, Defendants in Illinois Capital Trials Need the Best Attorneys Available. But
they Often Get Some of the Worst., Chi. Trib., Nov. 15, 1999, at 10.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. This colloquy is cited in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Harrison in
People v. Rissley, No. 82536, at *1 (111. Mar. 15, 2001) (dissent subsequently stricken)
at
available
36
&invl=.
http://caselaw.1p.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=il&vol=/sc/2001/825
The Illinois Supreme Court later vacated that opinion upon granting rehearing. See
People v. Rissley, 795 N.E.2d 174 (Il. 2003).
25. Governor George H. Ryan, Address at Northwestern University School of
at
2003),
11,
(Jan.
Law
see also
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongfulURyanSpeech.htm;
Comm'n on Capital Punishment, Report 105, at ch. 7 (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/chapter_07.pdf.
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stress the need for independence in the selection and funding of
defense counsel and the need to control the workload of defense
counsel to permit the rendering of quality representation.26 Of special
significance to capital cases and other complex matters, these
principles establish that defense counsel's ability, training, and
experience must match the complexity of the case.27 The principles set
forth general guidelines that speak directly to the value of equality
that goes to the heart of Gideon: that there be parity between defense
counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources, and that
defense counsel be included as an equal partner in the justice system.
The American Bar Association similarly has promulgated extensive
guidelines for representation in capital cases.28
Yet, despite these obvious solutions, the promise of Gideon remains
unfulfilled in many jurisdictions.
Stephen Bright, the visionary
director of the Southern Center for Human Rights, put is so well when
he wrote that "[n]o constitutional right is celebrated so much 29in the
abstract and observed so little in reality as the right to counsel.
This is Gideon's paradox. On the one hand, of all the major
criminal justice decisions of the Warren Court, Gideon is the one that
no one seeks to overrule. The exclusionary rule30 is the subject of
constant attack,31 and Miranda32 remains unpopular in many circles.33
By contrast, the validity of Gideon-at least as an abstract matter-is
universally accepted.34
Yet, as Rhode describes, despite the
widespread acceptance of Gideon, there remains a systemic failure in
many areas of the country to actually follow the essence of the ruling
in Gideon.
The answer to this puzzle lies in a cruel combination of economics
and politics. On the economic front, the right recognized in Gideon is
a very expensive one to implement.3 5 More than any other decision in
26. ABA, The Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (Feb. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/resolutionl07.pdf.
27. Id.
28. ABA, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913
(2003).
29. Steohen B. Bright, Turning Celebrated Principles into Reality, Champion,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6.
30. Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
31. See, e.jz.. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,107 Harv. L.
Rev. 757. 785-800 (1994).
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of
Miranda's Defenders. 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1084 (1996); William J. Stuntz, Miranda's
Mistake, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 975 (2001).
34. Indeed, the Supreme Court continues to expand the breadth of the right to
counsel, if not the depth. See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002)
(suspended sentences may not be imposed without counsel or waiver of counsel).
35. For example,
[in] 1983, on the 20th anniversary of Gideon, the U.S. Department of Justice,
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the criminal justice arena, Gideon is an "enormous unfunded mandate
imposed upon the states. 3 6 The costs of fairly compensating those
who represent indigent defendants, hiring enough lawyers and support
staff to guard against overload, and providing funds for investigators
and experts are substantial ones. The courts have no budgets to
directly provide these services, so it is up to the legislative branch to
include these kinds of expenditures in their budgets. This is where
politics come into play.
To quote the late Robert Kennedy, "[t]he poor man charged with
crime has no lobby."37 There is no natural, powerful constituency
whose narrow self-interest is served by ensuring that the right to
competent counsel with adequate resources is implemented. Thus,
the need to fund indigent defense services is often relegated to a very
low place on the legislative priority list.
Indeed, the situation is often worse than the simple lack of a lobby
for indigent defense services. Some policy makers are actively
resistant to the idea of adequately funding indigent criminal defense.
After all, some argue, these defense lawyers are simply trying to
frustrate the efforts of the elected prosecutors to prosecute criminals.
If we trust our prosecutors to charge the guilty people, the thinking
goes, why should we spend money providing better funding to lawyers
who will not only cost money on their own but also will jack up the
cost of the prosecution? This thinking can be summed up in the words
of a Georgia prosecutor who opposed an indigent defense-funding
measure on the ground that "it was the greatest threat to the proper
enforcement of the criminal laws of this state ever presented."38
The challenge is to forge a strategy for breaking through this cycle
of apathy and antagonism that leads to such widespread failure to
make good on Gideon's promise. But how can this be done? How
can legislators be persuaded, in an era of fiscal austerity, in which

Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that state and local government had
spent approximately $625 million or a per capita cost of $2.76 on indigent
defense representation in the state courts of this country. In 2003, we do not
have a statistically valid expenditure figure for the 50 states, however, my
best estimate, based upon reliable data from two-thirds of the states, is that
the figure will exceed $3 billion dollars and the estimated per capita cost will
exceed $10.
Robert L. Spangenberg, In Atoreciation of the ABA's Gideon Efforts. Chamnion,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 35; see also Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 12, at 31-32; The
Spangenberg Group, State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services in
available
at
(Sept.
2003),
2002,
at
1
Fiscal
Year
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/indigentdefexp
end2003.pdf.
36. Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon's Promise: Lessons from England and
the Need for Federal Help, 55 Hastings L.J. 835, 843 (2004) (internal citations
omitted).
37. Anthonv Lewis. Gideon'sTrumpet 211 (1966).
38. Bright, supra note 29, at 7.
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even politically popular programs are being slashed, that resources for
indigent defense should be enhanced?
Perhaps they cannot be so persuaded. Perhaps we are dealing with
a classic example of a right enjoyed by a "discrete and insular
minorit[y]," which the political process itself cannot be entrusted to
protect. 39 Despite our rhetorical commitment to the presumption of
innocence, the class of whom we are speaking here-indigent people
charged with criminal offenses-is as powerless a class as one could
imagine.
If this is true-and to some extent, it surely is-the courts must
adopt a more aggressive role in implementing Gideon. To leave the
implementation of Gideon in the hands of the political branches is, in
some sense, to deconstitutionalize Gideon.
The courts have a variety of tools at their disposal to ensure
adherence to Gideon. The Supreme Court should reduce the burdens
it erected in Strickland v. Washington for defendants asserting that
they received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. For example,
once a defendant satisfies his burden of proving that his lawyer
provided incompetent representation at trial, the burden could shift to
the prosecution to prove that the lack of competent counsel was
harmless in the context of the case.4 °
Moreover, the Court should recognize that the only way to
guarantee a right to effective assistance of counsel at trial is to
guarantee counsel for post-conviction challenges to the adequacy of
the counsel who represented the defendant at trial.4' Otherwise, even
the shallow right now recognized in Strickland becomes a right
without a remedy for many of those who could clearly secure relief if
they only had post-conviction counsel to make their case. 4' Either of
these approaches, if applied with rigor, would generate systemic
reform by forcing counties or states to fund indigent defense at levels
that enable counsel to satisfy the courts' scrutiny.4 3
On a more general level, courts have an opportunity to address the
systemic failing of some indigent defense delivery systems through
civil suits that are increasingly being filed challenging these practices

39. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
40. At present, the burden is on the defendant to show "that the decision reached
would reasonablv likely have been different absent the errors."
Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
41. The current Supreme Court position is that there is no federal constitutional
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989).
42. See Clive A. Stafford Smith & Rdmv Voisin Starns. Folly bv Fiat: Pretendine
that Death Row Inmates Can Revresent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction
Proceedings,45 Loy. L. Rev. 55, 56 (1999).
43. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and CriminalJustice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 70 (1997).
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on a county-wide or state-wide basis." For example, the New York
County Lawyers' Association brought suit against the State of New
York and the City of New York in 2001 claiming that the caps on
compensation for appointed lawyers were unconstitutional.4 Those
caps were set at twenty-five dollars per hour for out-of-court time and
forty dollars per hour for time spent in court. 46 After a state trial
court judge invalidated the rates as unconstitutional,4 7 the State
settled the case by agreeing to pay seventy-five dollars per hour for all
work on felony cases and sixty dollars per hour for representation on
misdemeanors." Gone was the differential between in-court and outof-court work, a differential that generates natural incentives to shirk
pre-trial investigation and consultation to the great detriment of the
client.49 Similar litigation has succeeded in a number of other
jurisdictions."0
Describing some of the ways in which courts could put bite into
Gideon begs the question, though, of how the courts can be persuaded
to expend their limited judicial capital on this endeavor. Appeals to
constitutional theory alone are unlikely to suffice. Mapping the
doctrinal framework provides a way, but for the courts to choose that
way, they must first have the will. Thus, whether the focus is on
legislators or judges, the question remains the same: How can those
in power be persuaded to use that power to confront the continuing
crisis in indigent representation?
III. STIMULATING ACTION

There is no one answer to this quandary, but it is clear that the
campaign to enhance public support for indigent defense services
44. See Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the
Delivery of CriminalDefense Services, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 293 (2002); Note, Gideon's
Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 2062 (2000).
45. N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State of N.Y., 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup. Ct.
2003).
46. Id. at 400.
47. Id. at 397.
48. See Susan Saulny, Lawyers' Fees to Defend Poor Will Increase: Settlement in
Lawsuit over Rates Paidby City, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 2003, at B1.
49. After hearing extensive testimony on the point, Justice Lucindo Suarez found
that "[a]ssigned counsel maximize their in-court time at the higher rate in order to
financially survive.... The lower rate operates as a disincentive to perform necessary
out-of-court work." N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, 763 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (internal
citations omitted).
50. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (invalidating bid system for
indigent defense counsel as inadequate assistance); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La.
1993) (holding that the provision of indigent services was so inadequate that the court
would apply a rebuttable presumption that all defendants were not receiving effective
assistance of counsel); Bill Rankin, Coweta Settles Suit on Indigent Defense, Atlanta
J.-Const., Mar. 9, 2003, at C2 (describing Georgia case brought by the Southern
Center for Human Rights).
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must be framed in a manner that resonates with groups broader than
the traditional progressive communities that have long championed
the rights of criminal defendants. In Gideon, the Court advanced two
types of justifications for affording adequate counsel. First, from a
Kantian values-based perspective, the Court stressed the critical role
of the lawyer in ensuring a fair trial and equality.5 1 Second, from an
instrumentalist perspective, the Court observed that without the right
to counsel, a defendant "though he be not guilty,... faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.""2
These two arguments carry very different potentials to expand the
pool of those willing to invest in building an adequate indigent
defense system. When the value of indigent defense is cast in terms of
due process, equality, or intrinsic human rights, the audience willing to
divert precious resources to the endeavor will remain, unfortunately, a
narrow one. There is strong reason to believe, though, that a focus on
the more utilitarian values of providing adequate resources for
indigent defense services will significantly enhance public concern and
concomitant willingness to expend resources on defending the poor.
In this sense, the campaign to reform indigent defense has many
similarities to the campaign to reform (or abolish) capital punishment.
In the death penalty arena, the recent focus on wrongful convictions
has yielded real fruits in reopening the debate over capital
punishment.
When the debate over capital punishment focused on the propriety
of executing a defendant who committed various heinous acts, the
majority of Americans were unmoved by evidence of arbitrariness and
racism, much less by general philosophical or religious claims about
the morality of capital punishment. When the debate shifted to the
plight of innocent men and women who were sentenced to death,
however, the audience that was receptive grew dramatically.5 3
During the late 1990s, a series of exonerations throughout the
country, particularly in capital cases, spawned national attention to
flaws in the capital punishment system.5 4 The shift in momentum

51. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
52. Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
53. See Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 573, 576 (2004).
54. See Jim Dwyer, Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Actual Innocence: Five Days
to Execution and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly Convicted 67-69 (2000); Death
Penalty
Info.
Ctr.,
Innocence:
Freed
from
Death
Row,
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=6&did=110 (last visited Oct. 25,
2004); Northwestern Univ. Ctr. on Wrongful Convictions, The Exonerated:
Exonerations
in
All
States,
at
http://www.law.northwestern.eduldepts/clinic/wrongful/exonerations/States.htm
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2004).
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prompted by this new focus on innocence is unmistakable." In a
number of states, serious movements toward moratoria on executions
have begun. 6 In Illinois, a Republican Governor commuted all 167
death sentences in the state.57 Throughout the country, juries have
been imposing the death penalty less frequently. 8 Although it is
hardly the case that the majority of Americans have become
abolitionists, no one can dispute that there is a new focus on problems
with capital punishment, and the focus on innocence has spawned a
more generalized concern with the fairness of the ways in which the
death penalty is applied.
There is reason for optimism that this same shift in focus can yield
significant benefits in broadening the class of those who are
committed to the provision of high-quality indigent defense.59 In the
current social and political climate, a campaign for resources on behalf
of unsympathetic defendants who have received harsh sentences
because of the lack of adequate counsel is unlikely to garner much
support. By contrast, a campaign that emphasizes the extent to which
the lack of resources for indigent defense has resulted in the
6
conviction of innocent defendants has far more potential for success.
This is not only because the average person on the street is likely to
have a strong visceral reaction to the conviction of the innocent; it is
also because the conviction of the innocent poses a direct threat to law
and order. When the innocent have been put in prison for crimes they
did not commit, the guilty remain at large-free to commit further
acts of violence-despite the crimes they did commit.
Framed this way, the call for more resources for indigent defense
becomes a call for accuracy-a call for tough enforcement of the
criminal law against the truly guilty. Both the courts and legislators
now can, through the prism of wrongful convictions, be made to see
that the levels of funding committed to indigent defense-levels that
they once considered adequate to minimize the possibilities of errorhave proven inadequate to the task.

55. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Crisis in the American Death
at
available
(2004),
Penalty
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=1150.
56. See ABA Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, Building
Momentum: The American Bar Association Call for a Moratorium on Executions
at
available
2003),
(Aug.
Hold
Takes
http://www.abanet.org/moratorium/4thReport/4thAnnualReport.doc.
57. See Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All: Ryan Commutes 164
Death Sentences to Life in Prison Without Parole, Chi. Trib., Jan. 12, 2003, at 1; see
also Ryan, supra note 25.
58. See Adam Liptak, Fewer Death Sentences Being Imposed in U.S., N.Y. Times,
Sept. 15, 2004, at A16.
59. See Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, Crim. Just., Fall 2003, at 37.
60. Id.
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In 1999, Judge Richard Posner observed that although lawyers who
represent indigent defendants often provide poor representation, they
"seem to be good enough to reduce the probability of convicting an
innocent person to a very low level. ' 61 It would be reckless to make
such a claim today, given what we now know about rates of wrongful
convictions -only
a small percentage of which are actually
uncovered.62

This relationship between adequacy of counsel and accuracy of
conviction has not been lost on policy makers. In Illinois, the
epicenter of the debate due to a staggering seventeen death row
exonerations, the Illinois Supreme Court reacted with a set of new
standards for counsel in capital cases. 63 The new rules create a
specialized capital bar and require, with some exceptions, that only
certified members of the capital bar may act as defense lawyers or
prosecutors in capital cases.' Certification requires specified levels of
criminal trial experience and specialized training. 65 Although there is
cause for concern about the level of scrutiny with which admission to
the capital bar has been regulated,66 the promulgation of these
standards is a testament to the power of the innocence issue to trigger
action with respect to adequacy of representation.
It is no accident, then, that Congress's measure to improve the
quality of defense counsel for the indigent is called the "Innocence
Protection Act.

' 67

One section of that Act establishes thirty million

dollars per year in grants to states to promote quality representation
in capital cases and requires states accepting such grants to adopt
minimum standards for counsel in such cases. 68 The Act is hardly a
panacea: Among its other shortcomings, it does nothing for those
facing lengthy prison sentences without effective counsel. But it is an
important step in the right direction and drives home the power of the
innocence issue to stimulate funding for indigent defense.
Given the obvious concern with the expenses of providing indigent
defense, it is imperative to make sure that policy makers appropriately
61. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 164 (1999).
62. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Do ExonerationsProve that "The System Works?",
86 Judicature 83 (2003) (discussing the fortuities through which wrongful convictions
are uncovered and the reasons to believe that only a small fraction are ever
uncovered).
63. I11. Sup. Ct. R. 714.
64. Id.
65. Id. § 714(b).
66. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Lawyers Still on List for Capital
Cases: Reforms Fail to Weed out Problems, Chi. Trib., Mar. 10, 2002, §4, at 1; Steve
Mills & Ken Armstrong, Death-Penalty Lawyers Panel Too Lax Former Member
Says, Chi. Trib., Mar. 12, 2002 at 4.
67. The Innocence Protection Act of 2004 is Title IV of the Justice for All Act of
2004. Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 401-432 (to be codified in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). It received overwhelming bipartisan support.
68. Id. § 413.
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consider the enormous costs of failing to provide adequate defense
services. The human costs are powerful in this regard, but it is also
useful to focus on the ways in which investments in adequate defense
can be recouped in dollar savings occasioned by avoiding wrongful
convictions. In the "Ford Heights Four" case, four men (Kenneth
Adams, Verneal Jimerson, Willie Rainge, and Dennis Williams) and
one woman (Paula Adams) were convicted of a 1978 Cook County
rape and double murder.6 9 Williams and Jimerson had been
sentenced to death; the others were sentenced to life or lengthy terms
of years. By the time evidence of their innocence emerged in 1996through DNA tests and confessions from the true killers -three of the
men (Adam, Rainge, and Williams) had spent eighteen years in
prison, Jimerson had spent eleven years behind bars, and Gray had
been imprisoned for nine years.70 Ultimately, Cook County paid the
men thirty-six million dollars to settle their civil rights actions.7 1
Gray's civil rights suit remains pending.72 Beyond these payouts,
Cook County spent well over two million dollars in defending the civil
rights lawsuits.7 3 In addition, the State of Illinois has paid the five
defendants approximately $600,00074 under its compensation statute
for the wrongly convicted.7 5 In addition to these costs, the State also
incurred the needless expense of imprisoning these innocent
defendants for seventy-six years collectively. At the current rate of
approximately $22,000 per year to incarcerate an inmate,7 6 these
seventy-six years cost Illinois taxpayers another $1.7 million in wasted
resources. Thus, without even trying to assess the costs of the
multiple trials and appeals involving these innocent individuals, the
tab for the errors in this one case come out to over forty million
dollars in direct expenditures (with one major lawsuit still pending).
There is, of course, no way to guarantee that the wrongful
convictions in the Ford Heights Four case could have been prevented
had they been represented by more competent counsel. There is no
doubt, though, that many wrongful convictions could be prevented by
adequate counsel. Examining the costs of this one case-albeit one
69. See David Protess & Rob Warden, A Promise of Justice (1998).
70. Id.
71. See Robert Becker, Ford Heights 4 to Get Their Settlement from County, Chi.
Trib., Mar. 16, 1999, §2, at 3. See generally Peter M. King & William H. Jones, Crimes
of the State: Obtaining Justice for the Wrongfully Imprisoned, Litigation, Fall 2002, at
14.
72. Telephone Interview with Thomas Decker, Counsel for Paula Gray (Sept. 17,
2004).
73. Telephone Interview with Robert Warden, Executive Director, Center on
Wrongful Convictions (Sept. 12, 2004).
74. Id.
75. See 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/8(c) (West 2004).
76. See Ill. Dep't of Corrections, Financial Impact Statement (2003), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/reports/financial-impact-statements/2003-Fina
ncialImpactStatement.pdf.
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with an especially high price tag in government expendituresdemonstrates that at least some of the expenses of an adequate
indigent defense system can be recouped through savings generated
by avoiding errors. Imagine how much good could have been done
had this forty million dollars been spent systemically, instead of
repairing the damage caused by just one case.
Ultimately, a system that skimps on indigent defense resources does
so at its peril. It is not the investment in indigent defense that is
wasteful. Rather, the true waste of money and energy is to invest
heavily in a criminal justice system-to spend so much on
infrastructure, judges and prosecutors-but then skimp on the
defense, the other element that is critical to making the criminal
process a trustworthy means of ascertaining the truth. The competent
defense lawyer is not the enemy of justice; she is an indispensable
party to the process through which we secure justice.
To borrow from Justice Thurgood Marshall's hypothesis about the
future of capital punishment, I am confident that the current state of
affairs will not be able to survive once the public is made aware of the
scope and nature of the problem.77 The good people of America do
not know about the horror stories that Deborah Rhode has described.
They do not know that defendants are sitting in jails for thirteen
months without ever meeting a lawyer, or that grossly incompetent
lawyers whom none of us would trust with traffic offenses are being
entrusted with the lives and liberty of indigent defendants. Once
America is properly educated about these realities, the public will
understand and support the need for reform, as is now beginning to
occur in some jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION

It was almost a hundred years ago that President William Howard
Taft told the Virginia Bar Association that "[w]e must make it so that
a poor person will have as nearly as possible an equal opportunity in
litigating as the rich person, and under present conditions, ashamed as
we may be of it, that is not the fact."78 Sadly, it is still not the fact,
despite the promise of Gideon. Deborah Rhode's important new
book reminds us all that the rule of law depends on the availability of
competent counsel with adequate resources. We have come too far to
allow the rule of power to prevail.

77. The "Marshall hypothesis" predicts that if Americans could be educated about
the realities of the ways in which capital punishment is administered, support for the
death penalty would erode. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 351-62 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring).
78. Bright, supra note 29, at 6 (internal punctuation omitted).

